MEMORANDUM

To: Tara Katuk Mac Lean Sweeney, Assistant Secretary – Indian Affairs

Through: Eric N. Shepard, Associate Solicitor, Division of Indian Affairs
John Hay, Assistant Solicitor, Branch of Environment and Lands, Division of Indian Affairs

From: Christina Kracher, Attorney-Advisor, Branch of Environment and Lands, Division of Indian Affairs

Subject: Federal Jurisdiction Status of Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians in 1934

On October 8, 2009, the Picayune Rancheria of the Chukchansi Indians (“Picayune Tribe” or “Tribe”) submitted an application to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) requesting that the Secretary of the Interior (“Secretary”) acquire land in trust for the Tribe’s benefit (“Application”). The Tribe submitted its Application pursuant to Section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”) and its implementing regulations.

Section 5 of the IRA (“Section 5”) authorizes the Secretary to acquire land in trust for “Indians.” Section 19 of the Act (“Section 19”) defines “Indian” to include several categories of persons. As relevant here, the first definition includes all persons of Indian descent who are members of “any recognized Indian tribe now under federal jurisdiction” (“Category 1”). In 2009, the United States Supreme Court (“Supreme Court”) in Carcieri v. Salazar construed the term “now” in Category 1 to refer to 1934, the year of the

2 25 C.F.R. § 151.
3 IRA, § 5.
4 Id. (“The Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized, in his discretion, to acquire through purchase, relinquishment, gift, exchange, or assignment, any interest in lands, water rights, or surface rights to lands, within or without existing reservations, including trust or otherwise restricted allotments whether the allottee be living or deceased, for the purpose of providing land for Indians.”).
5 Id. § 19 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 5129).
6 Id.
IRA’s enactment. The Supreme Court did not consider the meaning of the phrases “under federal jurisdiction” or “recognized Indian tribe.”

In connection with the Tribe’s pending fee-to-trust Application, you have asked whether the Tribe is eligible for trust land acquisitions under Category 1. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that dispositive evidence demonstrates that the Tribe was “under federal jurisdiction” in 1934. The Tribe is therefore eligible under Category 1. Accordingly, the Secretary has authority to acquire land into trust for the Tribe.

I. BACKGROUND

The Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians is located in Madera County near Coarsegold, California. The Tribe is one of about fifteen groups, collectively referred to as “Foothill Yokuts” that have historically occupied the western slopes of the Sierra Nevada from the Fresno River to the Kern River. Alongside several other Foothill Yokut groups, the Tribe occupied the northern foothill region near the present-day towns of Coarsegold and Oakhurst. Prior to reservoir construction in the area flooding the lands, the Chukchansi had established pre-contact communities near these present-day towns.

The Picayune Rancheria was established by Executive Order of April 24, 1912, which set aside 80 acres for exclusively Indian use. In 1958, Congress passed the California Rancheria Act, aimed at terminating the federal trusteeship over 41 California tribes, including the Picayune Rancheria. Under the Act, tribal assets, including the Rancheria trust lands, would pass to individual tribal members. On February 18, 1966, the Department published a federal register notice of an asset distribution plan and formalizing termination of the Picayune Rancheria and the status of individuals as Indians.

In 1979, in Tillie Hardwick et al. v. United States (“Hardwick I”), individuals from 34 of the terminated California tribes brought a class action suit against the United States, challenging the California Rancheria Act and seeking to restore their status as Indians and the Rancheria as a reservation. In 1983, the United States ultimately reached a stipulated settlement with individuals from seventeen of the 34 terminated tribes, including members from the Picayune Rancheria.

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8 This opinion does not address the Tribe’s eligibility under any other definition of “Indian” in the IRA.
10 Id. While there were 15 groups referred to generally as Foothill Yokuts, each remained politically, culturally, linguistically, and geographically distinct.
11 Id. at 483.
12 Exec. Order No. 1522 (April 24, 1912).
14 Notice of Termination of Federal Supervision Over Property and Individual Members, 31 Fed. Reg. 2911 (Feb. 18, 1966) (“Notice to the land on the North Fork, Picayune, Graton, and Pinocheville Rancherias has passed from the U.S. Government under the distribution plans approved on April 29, 1960; June 30, 1960; September 17, 1959; and May 10, 1960; respectively, for the above-named Rancherias.”).
Rancheria ("Hardwick I stipulation").\textsuperscript{16} As relevant here, the settlement resulted in the restoration of the status of individuals from the Picayune Rancheria as Indians and the United States' recognition of the Rancheria with the same status as that prior to the California Rancheria Act.\textsuperscript{17} Additionally, the Hardwick I stipulation provided that the "Tribes, Bands, Communities or groups of the seventeen Rancherias shall be included on the Bureau of Indian Affairs' Federal Register list of recognized tribal entities pursuant to 25 C.F.R, Section 83.6(b)."\textsuperscript{18} On June 11, 1984, the Assistant Secretary – Indian Affairs published a federal register notice providing for the restoration of the Rancherias, including Picayune.\textsuperscript{19} The following year and thereafter, the BIA included the Tribe on the list of federally recognized tribes published in the Federal Register.\textsuperscript{20}

However, the Hardwick I stipulation did not address restoration of the Rancheria boundaries and reserved the matter for further proceedings.\textsuperscript{21} In 1987, Madera County and the Tribe stipulated that the "original boundaries of the [Picayune Rancheria] . . . are hereby restored, and all land within these restored boundaries of the . . . [Picayune Rancherias] are declared to be "Indian Country".\textsuperscript{22} They further stipulated that the Rancheria would be treated by the County and the United States as any other "federally recognized Indian Reservation, and all of the laws of the United States that pertain to federally recognized Indian Tribes and Indians shall apply to the . . . [Picayune Rancherias]."\textsuperscript{23} The United States has since treated the Picayune Rancheria accordingly.\textsuperscript{24}

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

1. Four-Step Procedure to Determine Eligibility.

Section 5 of the IRA provides the Secretary discretionary authority to acquire any interest in lands for the purpose of providing lands in trust for Indians.\textsuperscript{25} Section 19 defines "Indian" in relevant part as including the following three categories:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{16} *Hardwick I*, Stipulation and Order for Entry of Judgment (Dec. 22, 1983).
  \item \textsuperscript{17} Id. ¶ 3.
  \item \textsuperscript{18} Id. ¶ 4.
  \item \textsuperscript{19} Restoration of Federal Status to 17 California Rancherias, 49 Fed. Reg. 24084 (June 11, 1984).
  \item \textsuperscript{20} See Indian Tribal Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services, 50 Fed. Reg. 6055 (Feb. 13, 1985).
  \item \textsuperscript{21} *Hardwick I*, ¶ 5.
  \item \textsuperscript{22} Tillie *Hardwick et al. v. United States*, No. C-79-1710-SW, at 4 (N.D. Cal. June 16, 1987) (emphasis in original) ("Hardwick II stipulation"). The parties also stipulated to boundary restoration of the North Fork Rancheria.
  \item \textsuperscript{23} Id.
  \item \textsuperscript{24} Although the United States did not sign the Hardwick II stipulation as a result of tax issues with Madera County, the United States considers itself bound by both the Hardwick I and Hardwick II stipulations. In a 2000 opinion determining that fee lands within the Picayune Rancheria qualify as Indian lands under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, the Department opined that while the United States was not a signatory to the Hardwick II stipulation, it was a signatory to the Hardwick I stipulation, where it agreed that the court would retain jurisdiction over the boundary issue in further proceedings. See Letter to Kevin Washburn, General Counsel, National Indian Gaming Commission from Derrill B. Jordan, Associate Solicitor, Division of Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior (March 2, 2000). The Department noted the Hardwick II stipulation was one of "further proceedings" that Hardwick I anticipated. See Letter to Sara Drake, California Department of Justice from Danna Jackson, Staff Attorney, National Indian Gaming Commission (Dec. 3, 2001) (discussing gaming eligibility of Picayune Rancheria lands premised on the Department's 2000 opinion).
  \item \textsuperscript{25} 25 U.S.C. § 5108.
\end{itemize}
_Category 1_ all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction, and _Category 2_ all persons who are descendants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within the present boundaries of any Indian reservation, and shall further include _Category 3_ all other persons of one-half or more Indian blood.\(^{26}\)

In 2009, the Supreme Court in _Carcieri_ construed the term “now” in Category 1 to refer to 1934, the year of the IRA’s enactment.\(^{27}\) The Supreme Court did not consider the meaning of the phrase “under federal jurisdiction,” however, or whether it applied to the phrase “recognized Indian tribe.”

To guide the implementation of the Secretary’s discretionary authority under Section 5 after _Carcieri_, the Department in 2010 prepared a two-part procedure for determining when an applicant tribe was “under federal jurisdiction” in 1934.\(^{28}\) The Solicitor of the Interior (“Solicitor”) later memorialized the Department’s interpretation in Sol. Op. M-37029.\(^{29}\) Despite this, however, uncertainty persisted over what evidence could be submitted for the inquiry and how the Department would weigh it, prompting some tribes to devote considerable resources to researching and collecting any and all forms of potentially relevant evidence, in some cases leading to submissions totaling thousands of pages. To address this uncertainty, in 2018 the Solicitor’s Office began a review of the Department’s eligibility procedures to provide guidance for determining relevant evidence. This prompted questions concerning Sol. Op. M-37029’s interpretation of Category 1, on which its eligibility procedures relied. This uncertainty prompted the Solicitor to review Sol. Op. M-37029’s two-part procedure for determining eligibility under Category 1, and the interpretation on which it relied.

On March 9, 2020, the Solicitor withdrew Sol. Op. M-37029. The Solicitor concluded that its interpretation of Category 1 was not consistent with the ordinary meaning, statutory context, legislative history, or contemporary administrative understanding of the phrase “recognized Indian tribe now under federal jurisdiction.”\(^{30}\) In its place, the Solicitor issued a new, four-step procedure for determining eligibility under Category 1 to be used by attorneys in the Office of the Solicitor (“Solicitor’s Office”).\(^{31}\)

\(^{26}\) 25 U.S.C. § 5129 (bracketed numerals added).

\(^{27}\) _Carcieri_ 555 U.S. at 395.

\(^{28}\) U.S. Dep’t. of the Interior, Assistant Secretary, Record of Decision, _Trust Acquisition of, and Reservation Proclamation for the 151.87-acre Cowlitz Parcel in Clark County, Washington, for the Cowlitz Indian Tribe_ at 77-106 (Dec. 17, 2010) (“Cowlitz ROD”). See also Memorandum from the Solicitor to Regional Solicitors, Field Solicitors, and SOL-Division of Indian Affairs, Checklist for Solicitor’s Office Review of Fee-to-Trust Applications (Mar. 7, 2014), revised (Jan. 5, 2017).


\(^{31}\) _Procedure for Determining Eligibility for Land-into-Trust under the First Definition of “Indian” in Section 19 of the Indian Reorganization Act_, Memorandum from the Solicitor to Regional Solicitors, Field Solicitors, and SOL-Division of Indian Affairs (Mar. 10, 2020) (“Solicitor’s Guidance”).
At Step One, the Solicitor's Office determines whether or not Congress enacted legislation after 1934 making the IRA applicable to a particular tribe. The existence of such authority makes it unnecessary to determine if the tribe was "under federal jurisdiction" in 1934. In the absence of such authority, the Solicitor's Office proceeds to Step Two.

Step Two determines whether the applicant tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934, that is, whether the evidence shows that the federal government exercised or administered its responsibilities toward Indians in 1934 over the applicant tribe or its members as such. If so, the applicant tribe may be deemed eligible under Category 1 without further inquiry. The Solicitor's Guidance describes types of evidence that presumptively demonstrate that a tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934. In the absence of dispositive evidence, the inquiry proceeds to Step Three.

Step Three determines whether an applicant tribe's evidence sufficiently demonstrates that the applicant tribe was "recognized" in or before 1934 and remained under jurisdiction in 1934. The Solicitor determined that the phrase "recognized Indian tribe" as used in Category 1 does not have the same meaning as the modern concept of a "federally recognized" (or "federally acknowledged") tribe, a concept that did not evolve until the 1970s, after which it was incorporated in the Department's federal acknowledgment procedures. Based on the Department's historic understanding of the term, the Solicitor interpreted "recognition" to refer to indicia of congressional and executive actions either taken toward a tribe with whom the United States dealt on a more or less government-to-government basis or that clearly acknowledged a trust responsibility consistent with the evolution of federal Indian policy. The Solicitor identified forms of evidence that establish a rebuttable presumption that that an applicant tribe was "recognized" in a political-legal sense before 1934 and remained under federal jurisdiction in 1934. In the absence of such evidence, the inquiry finally moves to Step Four.

Step Four assesses the totality of an applicant tribe's non-dispositive evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to show that a tribe was "recognized" in or before 1934 and remained "under federal jurisdiction" through 1934. Given the historical changes in federal Indian policy over time, and the corresponding evolution of the Department's responsibilities, a one-size-fits-all approach for evaluating the totality of a tribal applicant's evidence is not possible or desirable. Attorneys in the Solicitor's Office must evaluate the evidence on a case-by-case basis within the context of a tribe's unique circumstances, and in consultation with the Deputy Solicitor for Indian Affairs and the Associate Solicitor, Division of Indian Affairs.

To further assist Solicitor's Office attorneys in implementing this four-step procedure by understanding the statutory interpretation on which it relies, the Solicitor's Guidance includes a memorandum detailing the Department's revised interpretation of the meaning of the phrases "now under federal jurisdiction" and "recognized Indian tribe" and how they work together.

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32 25 C.F.R. § 83.
33 Determining Eligibility under the First Definition of "Indian" in Section 19 of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, Memorandum from the Deputy Solicitor for Indian Affairs to the Solicitor (Mar. 5, 2020) ("Deputy Solicitor's Memorandum").

a. Statutory Context.

The Solicitor first concluded that the phrase “now under federal jurisdiction” should be read as modifying the phrase “recognized Indian tribe.”34 The Supreme Court in Carcieri did not identify a temporal requirement for recognition as it did for being under federal jurisdiction,35 and the majority opinion focused on the meaning of “now” without addressing whether or how the phrase “now under federal jurisdiction” modifies the meaning of “recognized Indian tribe.”36 In his concurrence, Justice Breyer also advised that a tribe recognized after 1934 might nonetheless have been “under federal jurisdiction” in 1934.37 By “recognized,” Justice Breyer appeared to mean “federally recognized”38 in the formal, political sense that had evolved by the 1970s, not in the sense in which Congress likely understood the term in 1934. He also considered how “later recognition” might reflect earlier “Federal jurisdiction,”39 and gave examples of tribes federally recognized after 1934 with whom the United States had negotiated treaties before 1934.40 Justice Breyer’s suggestion that Category 1 does not preclude eligibility for tribes “federally recognized” after 1934 is consistent with interpreting Category 1 as requiring evidence of federal actions toward a tribe with whom the United States dealt on a more or less sovereign-to-sovereign basis or for whom the federal government had clearly acknowledged a trust responsibility in or before 1934, as the example of the Stillaguamish Tribe of Indians of Washington (“Stillaguamish Tribe”) shows.41 It is also consistent with the Department’s policies that in order to apply for trust-land acquisitions under the IRA, a tribe must appear on the official list of entities federally recognized as eligible for the special programs and services provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as such.42

34 Deputy Solicitor’s Memorandum at 19. See also Cty. of Amador v. United States Dep’t of the Interior, 872 F.3d 1012, 1020, n. 8 (Carcieri leaves open whether “recognition” and “jurisdiction” requirements are distinct requirements or comprise a single requirement).
35 Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 382-83.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 398 (Breyer, J., concurring).
38 Id.
39 Id. at 399 (Breyer, J., concurring).
40 Id. at 398-99 (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing Stillaguamish Tribe, Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, and Mole Lake Chippewa Indians).
41 Id.
The Solicitor noted that Category 1’s grammar supports this view. The adverb “now” is part of the prepositional phrase “under federal jurisdiction,” which it temporally qualifies. Prepositional phrases function as modifiers and follow the noun phrase that they modify. Category 1’s grammar therefore supports interpreting the phrase “now under federal jurisdiction” as intended to modify “recognized Indian tribe.” This interpretation finds further support in the IRA’s legislative history, discussed below, and in Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier’s statement that the phrase “now under federal jurisdiction” was intended to limit the IRA’s application. This suggests Commissioner Collier understood the phrase “now under federal jurisdiction” to limit and thus modify “recognized Indian tribe.” This is further consistent with the IRA’s purpose and intent, which was to remedy the harmful effects of allotment. These included the loss of Indian lands and the displacement and dispersal of tribal communities. Lacking an official list of “recognized” tribes at the time, it was unclear in 1934 which tribes remained under federal supervision. Because the policies of allotment and assimilation went

43 Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde Cnty. of Oregon v. Jewell, 830 F.3d 552, 560 (D.C. Cir. 2016). The Grand Ronde court found “the more difficult question” to be which part of the expression “recognized Indian tribe” the prepositional phrase modified. Id. The court concluded it modified only the word “tribe” “before its modification by the adjective ‘recognized.’” Id. But the court appears to have understood “recognized” as used in the IRA as meaning “federally recognized” in the modern sense, without considering its meaning in historical context.


45 L. Beason and M. Lester, A Commonsense Guide to Grammar and Usage 15-16 (7th ed.) (2015) (“Adjective prepositional phrases are always locked into position following the nouns they modify.”); see also J. E. Wells, Practical Review Grammar 305 (1928). A noun phrase consists of a noun and all of its modifiers. Id. at 16.

46 To Grant to Indians Living Under Federal Tutelage the Freedom to Organize for Purposes of Local Self-Government and Economic Enterprise: Hearings on S. 2755 and S. 3645 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73rd Cong. at 266 (Apr. 26, 1934) (statement of Commissioner Collier) (hereafter “Sen. Hrgs.”). See also Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 389 (citing Letter from John Collier, Commissioner, to Superintendents (Mar. 7, 1936) ([IRA Section 19] provides, in effect, that the term ‘Indian’ as used therein shall include—(1) all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized tribe that was under Federal jurisdiction at the date of the Act * * *)) (emphasis added by Supreme Court); Cty. of Amador, 872 F.3d at 1026 (“under Federal jurisdiction” should be read to limit the set of “recognized Indian tribes” to those tribes that already had some sort of significant relationship with the federal government as of 1934, even if those tribes were not yet “recognized” (emphasis original)); Grand Ronde, 830 F.3d at 564 (though the IRA’s jurisdictional nexus was intended as “some kind of limiting principle,” precisely how remained unclear).

47 Readjustment of Indian Affairs. Hearings before the Committee on Indian Affairs, House of Representatives, Seventy-Third Congress, Second Session, on H.R. 7902, A Bill To Grant To Indians Living Under Federal Tutelage The Freedom To Organize For Purposes Of Local Self-Government And Economic Enterprise; To Provide For The Necessary Training Of Indians In Administrative And Economic Affairs; To Conserve And Develop Indian Lands; And To Promote The More Effective Administration Of Justice In Matters Affecting Indian Tribes And Communities By Establishing A Federal Court Of Indian Affairs, 73d Cong. at 233-34 (1934) (hereafter “H. Hrgs.”) (citing Letter, President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Rep. Edgar Howard (Apr. 28, 1934)).

48 Id.

49 In 1979, the BIA for the first time published in the Federal Register a list of federally acknowledged Indian tribes. “Indian Tribal Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs,” 44 Fed. Reg. 7235 (Feb. 6, 1979); see also Cty. of Amador, 872 F.3d at 1023 (“In 1934, when Congress enacted the IRA, there was no comprehensive list of recognized tribes, nor was there a ‘formal policy or process for determining tribal status’” (citing William Wood, Indians, Tribes, and (Federal) Jurisdiction, 65 U. Kan. L. Rev. 415, 429-30 (2016))嫌}.
hand-in-hand, left unmodified, the phrase “recognized Indian tribe” could include tribes disestablished or terminated before 1934.

b. Statutory Terms.

The Solicitor concluded that the expression “now under federal jurisdiction” in Category 1 cannot reasonably be interpreted as synonymous with the sphere of Congress’s plenary authority and is instead better interpreted as referring to tribes with whom the United States had clearly dealt on or a more or less sovereign-to-sovereign basis or as to whom the United States had clearly acknowledged a trust responsibility in or before 1934.

The contemporaneous legal definition of “jurisdiction” defined it as the “power and authority” of the courts “as distinguished from the other departments.” The legal distinction between judicial and administrative jurisdiction is significant. Further, because the statutory phrase at issue here includes more than just the word “jurisdiction,” its use of the preposition “under” sheds additional light on its meaning. In 1934, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY defined “under” as most frequently used in “its secondary sense meaning of ‘inferior’ or ‘subordinate.’” It defined “jurisdiction” in terms of “power and authority,” further defining “authority” as used “[i]n government law” as meaning “the right and power of public officers to require obedience to their orders lawfully issued in the scope of their public duties.”

Congress added the phrase “under federal jurisdiction” to a statute designed to govern the Department’s administration of Indian affairs and certain benefits for Indians. Seen in that light, these contemporaneous definitions support interpreting the phrase as referring to the federal government’s exercise and administration of its responsibilities for Indians. Further support for this interpretation comes from the IRA’s context. Congress enacted the IRA to promote tribal self-government but made the Secretary responsible for its implementation. Interpreting the phrase “now under federal jurisdiction” as modifying “recognized Indian tribe” supports the interpretation of “jurisdiction” to mean the continuing administration of federal authority over Indian tribes already “recognized” as such. The addition of the temporal adverb “now” to the phrase provides further grounds for interpreting “recognized” as referring to a previous exercise of that same authority, that is, in or before 1934.

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50 Hackford v. Babbitt, 14 F.3d 1457, 1459 (10th Cir. 1994).
51 Deputy Solicitor’s Memorandum at 9.
52 Black’s Law Dictionary at 1038 (3d ed. 1933) (hereafter “BLACK’s”).
53 Black’s at 1774.
54 Black’s at 171. It separately defines “subject to” as meaning “obedient to; governed or affected by.”
55 Our interpretation of “now under federal jurisdiction” does not require federal officials to have been aware of a tribe’s circumstances or jurisdictional status in 1934. As explained below, prior to M-37029, the Department long understood the term “recognized” to refer to political or administrative acts that brought a tribe under federal authority. We interpret “now under federal jurisdiction” as referring to the issue of whether such a “recognized” tribe maintained its jurisdictional status in 1934, i.e., whether federal trust obligations remained, not whether particular officials were cognizant of those obligations.
c. Legislative History.

The IRA’s legislative history lends additional support for interpreting “now under federal jurisdiction” as modifying “recognized Indian tribe.” A thread that runs throughout the IRA’s legislative history is a concern for whether the Act would apply to Indians not then under federal supervision. On April 26, 1934, Commissioner Collier informed members of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs (“Senate Committee”) that the original draft bill’s definition of “Indian” had been intended to do just that:56

Senator THOMAS of Oklahoma. (. . .) In past years former Commissioners and Secretaries have held that when an Indian was divested of property and money in effect under the law he was not an Indian, and because of that numerous Indians have gone from under the supervision of the Indian Office.

Commissioner COLLIER. Yes.

Senator THOMAS. Numerous tribes have been lost (. . .) It is contemplated now to hunt those Indians up and give them a status again and try do to something for them?

Commissioner COLLIER: This bill provides that any Indian who is a member of a recognized Indian tribe or band shall be eligible to [sic] Government aid.

Senator THOMAS. Without regard to whether or not he is now under your supervision?

Commissioner COLLIER. Without regard; yes. It definitely throws open Government aid to those rejected Indians.57

The phrase “rejected Indians” referred to Indians who had gone out from under federal supervision.58 In Commissioner Collier’s view, the IRA “does definitely recognize that an Indian [that] has been divested of his property is no reason why Uncle Sam does not owe him something. It owes him more.”59 Commissioner Collier’s broad view was consistent with the

56 Sen. Hrgs. at 80; see also Grand Ronde, 75 F.Supp.3d at 387, 399 (noting same).
57 Sen. Hrgs. at 79-80 (emphasis added).
58 See Lewis Meriam, The Institute for Govt. Research, Studies in Administration, The Problem of Indian Administration 763 (1928) (hereafter “Meriam Report”) (noting that issuance of patents to individual Indians under Dawes Act or Burke Act had “the effect of removing them in part at least from the jurisdiction of the national government”). See also Sen. Hrgs. at 30 (statement of Commissioner Collier) (discussing the role the Allotment Policy had in making approximately 100,000 Indians landless).
59 Sen. Hrgs. at 80.
bill's original stated policy to "reassert the obligations of guardianship where such obligations have been improvidently relaxed." 60

On May 17, 1934, the last day of hearings, the Senate Committee continued to express concerns over the breadth of the bill's definition of "Indian," returning again to the draft definitions of "Indian" as they stood in the committee print. Category 1 now defined "Indian" as persons of Indian descent who were "members of any recognized Indian tribe." 61 As on previous days, 62 Chairman Wheeler and Senator Thomas questioned both the overlap between definitions and whether they would include Indians not then under federal supervision or persons not otherwise "Indian." 63

The Senate Committee's concerns for these issues touched on other provisions of the IRA as well. The colloquy that precipitated the addition of "now under federal jurisdiction" began with a discussion of Section 18, which authorized votes to reject the IRA by Indians residing on a reservation. Senator Thomas stated that this would exclude "roaming bands" or "remnants of a band" that are "practically lost" like those in his home state of Oklahoma, who at the time were neither "registered," "enrolled," "supervised," or "under the authority of the Indian Office." 64 Senator Thomas felt that "If they are not a tribe of Indians they do not come under [the Act]." 65

60 H.R. 7902, 73rd Cong. tit. III, § 1. See Sen. Hrgs. at 20 ("The bill does not bring to an end, or imply or contemplate, a cessation of Federal guardianship and special Federal service to Indians. On the contrary, it makes permanent the guardianship services, and reasserts them for those Indians who have been made landless by the Government's own acts.").

61 Sen. Hrgs. at 234 (citing committee print, § 19). The revised bill was renumbered S. 3645 and introduced in the Senate on May 18, 1934. Tribal Self-Government and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 955, 963 n. 55 (1972) (hereafter "Tribal Self-Government") (citing 78 CONG. REC. 9071 (1934)). S. 3645 which, as amended, became the IRA, differed significantly from H.R. 7902 and S. 2755, and its changes resulted from discussions between Chairman Wheeler and Commissioner John Collier to resolve and eliminate the main points in controversy. Sen. Hrgs. at 237. The Senate Committee reported S. 3645 out four days after its reintroduction, 78 CONG. REC. 9221, which the Senate debated soon after. The Senate passed the bill on June 12, 1934. Id. at 11139. The House began debate on June 15. Id. at 11724-44. H.R. 7902 was laid on the table and S. 3645 was passed in its place the same day, with some variations. Id. A conference committee was then formed, which submitted a report on June 16. Id. at 12001-04. The House and Senate both approved the final version on June 16. Id. at 12001-04, 12161-65, which was presented to the President and signed on June 18, 1934. Id. at 12340, 12451. See generally Tribal Self-Government at 961-63.

62 See, e.g., Sen. Hrgs. at 80 (remarks of Senator Elmer Thomas) (questioning whether bill is intended to extend benefits to tribes not now under federal supervision); id. (remarks of Chairman Wheeler) (questioning degree of Indian descent as drafted); id. at 150-151; id. at 164 (questioning federal responsibilities to existing wards with minimal Indian descent).

63 See, e.g., Sen. Hrgs. at 239 (discussing Sec. 3), 254 (discussing Sec. 10), 261-62 (discussing Sec. 18), 263-66 (discussing Sec. 19).

64 Sen. Hrgs. at 263.

65 Id. By "tribe," Senator Thomas here may have meant the Indians residing on a reservation. A similar usage appears earlier in the Committee's discussion of Section 10 of the committee print (enacted as Section 17 of the IRA), Sen. Hrgs. at 250-55. Section 10 originally required charters to be ratified by a vote of the adult Indians residing within "the territory specified in the charter." Id. at 232. Chairman Wheeler suggested using "on the reservation" instead to prevent "any small band or group of Indians" to "come in on the reservation and ask for a charter to take over tribal property." Id. at 253. Senator Joseph O'Mahoney recommended the phrase "within the
Chairman Wheeler conceded that such Indians lacked rights at the time, but emphasized that the purpose of the Act was intended “as a matter of fact, to take care of the Indians that are taken care of at the present time,” that is, those Indians then under federal supervision.

Acknowledging that landless Indians ought to be provided for, Chairman Wheeler questioned how the Department could do so if they were not “wards of the Government at the present time.” When Senator Thomas mentioned that the Catawbas in South Carolina and the Seminoles in Florida were “just as much Indians as any others,” despite not then being under federal supervision, Commissioner Collier pointed out that such groups might still come within Category 3’s blood-quantum criterion, which was then one-quarter. After a brief digression, Senator Thomas asked whether, if the blood quantum were raised to one-half, Indians with less than one-half blood quantum would be covered by the Act with respect to their trust property. Chairman Wheeler thought not, “unless they are enrolled at the present time.” As the discussion turned to Section 19, Chairman Wheeler returned to the blood quantum issue, stating that Category 3’s blood-quantum criterion should be raised to one-half, which it was in final version of the Act.

Senator Thomas then noted that Category 1 and Category 2, as drafted, were inconsistent with Category 3. Category 1 would include any person of “Indian descent” without regard to blood quantum, so long as they were members of a “recognized Indian tribe,” while Category 2 included their “descendants” residing on a reservation. Senator Thomas observed that under these definitions, persons with remote Indian ancestry could come under the Act. Commissioner Collier then pointed out that at least with respect to Category 2, the descendants would have to reside within a reservation at the present time.

territory over which the tribe has jurisdiction” instead, prompting Senator Peter Norbeck to ask what “tribe” meant—“Is that the reservation unit?” id. at 254. Commissioner Collier then read from Section 19, which at that time defined “tribe” as “any Indian tribe, band, nation, pueblo, or other native political group or organization,” a definition the Chairman suggested he could not support. Id. As ultimately enacted, Section 17 authorizes the Secretary to issue charters of incorporation to “one-third of the adult Indians” if ratified, however, “by a majority vote of the adult Indians living on the reservation.”

66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 264.
71 Id.
72 Id. (statement of Chairman Burton Wheeler) (“You will find here [i.e., Section 19] later on a provision covering just what you have reference to.”).
73 Id. at 264-65.
74 Id. at 264.
75 Id.
After asides on the IRA’s effect on Alaska Natives and the Secretary’s authority to issue patents, Chairman Wheeler finally turned to the IRA’s definition of “tribe,” which as then drafted included “any Indian tribe, band, nation, pueblo, or other native political group or organization.” Chairman Wheeler and Senator Thomas thought this definition too broad. Senator Thomas asked whether it would include the Catawbas, most of whose members were thought to lack sufficient blood quantum under Category 3, but who descended from Indians and resided on a state reservation. Chairman Wheeler thought not, if they could not meet the blood-quantum requirement. Senator O’Mahoney from Wyoming then suggested that Categories 1 and 3 overlapped, suggesting the Catawbas might still come within the definition of Category 1 since they were of Indian descent and they “certainly are an Indian tribe.”

Chairman Wheeler appeared to concede, admitting there “would have to [be] a limitation after the description of the tribe.” Senator O’Mahoney responded, saying “If you wanted to exclude any of them [from the Act] you certainly would in my judgment.” Chairman Wheeler proceeded to express concerns for those having little or no Indian descent being “under the supervision of the Government,” persons he had earlier suggested should be excluded from the Act. Apparently in response, Senator O’Mahoney then said, “If I may suggest, that could be handled by some separate provision excluding from the act certain types, but [it] must have a general definition.” It was at this point that Commissioner Collier, who attended the morning’s hearings with Assistant Solicitor Felix S. Cohen, asked

Would this not meet your thought, Senator: After the words ‘recognized Indian tribe’ in line 1 insert ‘now under Federal jurisdiction’? That would limit the act to the Indians now under Federal jurisdiction, except that other Indians of more than one-half Indian blood would get help.

Without further explanation or discussion, the hearings adjourned.

76 Id. at 265.
77 Id. at 265.
78 Compare Sen. Hrgs. at 6 (S. 2755, § 13(b)), with id. at 234 (committee print, § 19). The phrase “native political group or organization” was later removed.
79 Id. Hrgs. at 265.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 266. The Catawbas at the time resided on a reservation established for their benefit by the State of South Carolina. See Catawba Indians of South Carolina, Sen. Doc. 92, 71st Cong. (1930).
82 Id. at 264.
83 Id. at 266.
84 Id.
85 Id. Nevertheless, Senator O’Mahoney did not understand why the Act’s benefits should not be extended “if they are living as Catawba Indians.”
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 231.
89 Id. at 266.
The IRA's legislative history does not unambiguously explain what Congress intended "now under federal jurisdiction" to mean or in what way it was intended to limit the phrase "recognized Indian tribe." However, the same phrase was used in submissions by the Indian Rights Association to the House of Representatives Committee on Indian Affairs ("House Committee"), where it described "Indians under Federal jurisdiction" as not being subject to State laws. Variations of the phrase appeared elsewhere, as well. In a memorandum describing the draft IRA's purpose and operation, Commissioner Collier stated that under the bill, the affairs of chartered Indian communities would "continue to be, as they are now, subject to Federal jurisdiction rather than State jurisdiction." Commissioner Collier elsewhere referred to various western tribes that occupied "millions of contiguous acres, tribally owned and under exclusive Federal jurisdiction." Assistant Solicitor Charles Fahy, who would later become Solicitor General of the United States, described the constitutional authority to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes as being "within the Federal jurisdiction and not with the States' jurisdiction." These uses of "federal jurisdiction" in the governmental and administrative senses stand alongside its use throughout the legislative history in relation to courts specifically.

The IRA's legislative history elsewhere shows that Commissioner Collier distinguished between Congress's plenary authority generally and its application to tribes in particular contexts. He noted that Congress had delegated "most of its plenary authority to the Interior Department or the Bureau of Indian Affairs," which he further described as "clothed with the plenary power." But in turning to the draft bill's aim of allowing tribes to take responsibility for their own affairs, Commissioner Collier referred to the "absolute authority" of the Department by reference to "its rules and regulations," to which the Indians were subjected. Indeed, even before 1934, the Department routinely used the term "jurisdiction" to refer to the administrative units of the OIA having direct supervision of Indians.

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90 H. Hrgs. at 337 (statement of John Steere, President, Indian Rights Association) (n.d.).
91 Id. at 25 (Memorandum from Commissioner John Collier, The Purpose and Operation of the Wheeler-Howard Indian Rights Bill (S. 2755; H.R. 7902) (Feb. 19, 1934) (emphasis added).
92 Id. at 184 (statement of Commissioner Collier) (Apr. 8, 1934).
93 Assistant Solicitor Fahy served as Solicitor General of the United States from 1941 to 1945. See https://www.justice.gov/osg/bio/charles-fahy.
94 Id. at 319 (statement of Assistant Solicitor Charles Fahy).
95 Id. at 37 (statement of Commissioner Collier) (Feb. 22, 1934).
96 Id.
97 See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Office of Indian Affairs, Circ. No. 1538, Annual Report and Census, 1919 (May 7, 1919) (directing Indian agents to enumerate the Indians residing at their agency, with a separate report to be made of agency "under [the agent's] jurisdiction"); Circ. No. 3011, Statement of New Indian Service Policies (Jul. 14, 1934) (discussing organization and operation of Central Office related to "jurisdiction administrations," i.e., field operations); ARCLA for 1900 at 22 (noting lack of "jurisdiction" over New York Indian students); id. at 103 (reporting on matters "within" jurisdiction of Special Indian Agent in the Indian Territory); id. at 396 (describing reservations and villages covered by jurisdiction of Puyallup Consolidated Agency); Meriam Report at 140-41 ("[W]hat strikes the careful observer in visiting Indian jurisdictions is not their uniformity, but their diversity...Because of this diversity, it seems imperative to recommend that a distinctive program and policy be adopted for each jurisdiction, especially fitted to its needs."); Sen. Hrgs. at 282-98 (collecting various comments and opinions on the Wheeler-Howard Bill from tribes from different OIA "jurisdictions").
Construing "jurisdiction" as meaning governmental supervision and administration is further consistent with the term's prior use by the federal government. In 1832, for example, the United States by treaty assured the Creek Indians that they would be allowed to govern themselves free of the laws of any State or Territory, "so far as may be compatible with the general jurisdiction" of Congress over the Indians. 98 In The Cherokee Tobacco cases, the Supreme Court considered the conflict between subsequent Congressional acts and "[t]reaties with Indian nations within the jurisdiction of the United States." 99 In considering the 14th Amendment's application to Indians, the Supreme Court in Elk v. Wilkins also construed the Constitutional phrase, "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States," in the sense of governmental authority. 100

The evident meaning of these last words is, not merely subject in some respect or degree to the jurisdiction of the United States, but completely subject to their political jurisdiction, and owing them direct and immediate allegiance. 101

The terms of Category 1 suggest that the phrase "under federal jurisdiction" should not be interpreted to refer to the outer limits of Congress's plenary authority, since it could encompass tribes that existed in an anthropological sense but with whom the federal government had never exercised any relationship. Such a result would be inconsistent with the Department's understanding of "recognized Indian tribe" at the time, discussed below, as referring to a tribe with whom the United States had clearly dealt on a more or less sovereign-to-sovereign basis or for whom the federal government had clearly acknowledged a trust responsibility.

If "under federal jurisdiction" is understood to refer to the application and administration of the federal government's plenary authority over Indians, then the complete phrase "now under federal jurisdiction" can further be seen as resolving the tension between Commissioner Collier's desire that the IRA include Indians "[w]ithout regard to whether or not [they are] now under [federal] supervision" and the Senate Committee's concern to limit the Act's coverage to Indian wards "taken care of at the present time." 102

98 Treaty of March 24, 1832, art. XIV, 7 Stat. 366, 368; see also Act of May 8, 1906, 34 Stat. 182 (1906) (lands allotted to Indians in trust or restricted status to remain "subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States" until issuance of fee-simple patents).
99 The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616, 621 (1870). The Court further held that the consequences of such conflicts give rise to political questions "beyond the sphere of judicial cognizance." Id.
100 Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 102 (1884). See also United States v. Ramsay, 271 U.S. 470 (1926) (the conferring of citizenship does not make Indians subject to laws of the states).
101 Id.
102 Sen. Hrgs. at 79-80, 263. The district court in Grande Ronde noted these contradictory views. Grande Ronde, 75 F.Supp.3d at 399-400. Such views were expressed while discussing drafts of the IRA that did not include the phrase "now under federal jurisdiction."
3. The Meaning of the Phrase “Recognized Indian Tribe.”

Despite suggesting that the term “recognized” meant something different in 1934 than it did in the 1970s, Sol. Op. M-37029 had appeared to use these historically distinct concepts interchangeably. And while today’s concept of “federal recognition” merges the cognitive sense of “recognition” and the political-legal sense of “jurisdiction,” as Carcieri makes clear, the issue is what Congress meant in 1934, not how the concepts later evolved. 103 Congress’s authority to recognize Indian tribes flows from its plenary authority over Indian affairs. 104 Early in this country’s history, Congress charged the Secretary and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs with responsibility for managing Indian affairs and implementing general statutes enacted for the benefit of Indians. 105 Because Congress has not generally defined “Indian,” 106 it left it to the Secretary to determine to whom such statutes apply. 107 “Recognition” generally is a political question to which the courts ordinarily defer. 108

103 M-37029 at 8, n. 57 (citing Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 272 (1994) (in the absence of a statutory definition of a term, the court’s “task is to construe it in accord with its ordinary or natural meaning.”); id. at 275 (the court “presume[s] Congress intended the phrase [containing a legal term] to have the meaning generally accepted in the legal community at the time of enactment.”)).

104 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 319 (1978) (citing Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) (“Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the government.”)).

105 25 U.S.C. § 2 (charging Commissioner of Indian Affairs with management of all Indian affairs and all matters arising out of Indian relations); 43 U.S.C. § 1457 (charging Secretary with supervision of public business relating to Indians); 25 U.S.C. § 9 (authorizing President to prescribe regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of any act relating to Indian affairs). See also H. Hrgs. at 37 (remarks of Commissioner Collier) (“Congress through a long series of acts has delegated most of its plenary authority to the Interior Department or the Bureau of Indian Affairs, which as instrumentalities of Congress are clothed with the plenary power, an absolutist power”); id. at 51 (Memorandum of Commissioner John Collier) (providing statutory examples of “the broad discretionary powers conferred by Congress on administrative officers of the Government”).

106 U.S. Dept. of Interior, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, “Indian Wardship,” Circular No. 2958 (Oct. 28, 1933) (“No statutory definition seems to exist of what constitutes an Indian or of what Indians are wards of the Government.”); Eligibility of Non-enrolled Indians for Services and Benefits under the Indian Reorganization Act, Memorandum from Thomas W. Fredericks, Associate Solicitor, Indian Affairs, to Acting Deputy Commissioner of Indian Affairs (Dec. 4, 1978) (“there exists no universal definition of “Indian”). See also Letter from Kent Frizzell, Acting Secretary of the Interior, to David H. Getches, Esq. on behalf of the Stillaguamish Tribe, at 8-9 (Oct. 27, 1976) (suggesting that “recognized Indian tribe” in IRA § 19 refers to tribes that were “administratively recognized” in 1934).

107 Secretary’s Authority to Extend Federal Recognition to Indian Tribes, Memorandum from Reid P. Chambers, Associate Solicitor, Indian Affairs to Solicitor Kent Frizzell, at 1 (Aug. 20, 1974) (hereafter “Chambers Memo”) (“the Secretary, in carrying out Congress’s plan, must first determine, i.e., recognize, to whom [a statute] applies”); Letter from LaFollette Butler, Acting Dep. Comm. of Indian Affairs to Sen. Henry M. Jackson, Chair, Senate at 5 (Jun. 7, 1974) (hereafter “Butler Letter”) (same); Dobbs v. United States, 33 Ct. Cl. 308, 315-16 (1898) (recognition may be effected “by those officers of the Government whose duty it was to deal with and report the condition of the Indians to the executive branch of the Government”).

108 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 216 (1962) (citing United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. 407, 419 (1865) (deferring to decisions by the Secretary and Commissioner of Indian Affairs to recognize Indians as a tribe as political questions)). See also Memorandum from Alan K. Palmer, Acting Associate Solicitor, Indian Affairs, to Solicitor, Federal “Recognition” of Indian Tribes at 2-6 (Jul. 17, 1975) (hereafter “Palmer Memorandum”).
Sol. Op. M-37029 had understood that a tribe could be considered “recognized” for purposes of the IRA so long as it is “federally recognized” when the Act is applied. Arguendo, M-37029 concluded that even if “now” did modify “recognized Indian tribe,” the meaning of “recognized” was ambiguous. It described the term as having been used historically in two senses: a “cognitive” or “quasi-anthropological” sense indicating that federal officials “knew” or “realized” that a tribe existed; and a political-legal sense connoting “that a tribe is a governmental entity comprised of Indians and that the entity has a unique political relationship with the United States.” The Solicitor concluded that this interpretation departs from the Department’s prior, long-held understanding of “recognition” as referring to actions taken by appropriate federal officials toward a tribe with whom the United States clearly dealt on a more-or-less sovereign-to-sovereign basis or for whom the federal government had clearly acknowledged a trust responsibility in or before 1934.

a. Ordinary Meaning.

The 1935 edition of Webster’s New International Dictionary first defines the verb “to recognize” as meaning “to know again (...) to recover or recall knowledge of.” Most of the remaining entries focus on the legal or political meanings of the verb. These include, “To avow knowledge of (...) to admit with a formal acknowledgment; as, to recognize an obligation; to recognize a consul”; Or, “To acknowledge formally (...); specif: (...) To acknowledge by admitting to an associated or privileged status.” And, “To acknowledge the independence of (...) a community (...) by express declaration or by any overt act sufficiently indicating the intention to recognize.” These political-legal understandings seem consistent with how Congress used the term elsewhere in the IRA. Section 11, for example, authorizes federal appropriations for loans to Indians for tuition and expenses in “recognized vocational and trade schools.” While neither the Act nor its legislative history provide further explanation, the context strongly

109 M-37029 at 25 (interpreting IRA as not requiring determination that a tribal applicant was “a recognized Indian tribe” in 1934).
110 Id. at 24 (“To the extent that the courts (contrary to the views expressed here) deem the term ‘recognized Indian tribe’ in the IRA to require recognition in 1934”).
111 Id. M-37029 also notes that the political-legal sense of “recognized Indian tribe” evolved into the modern concept of “federal recognition” or “federal acknowledgment” by the 1970s, when the Department’s administrative acknowledgment procedures were developed. See 43 Fed. Reg. 39,361 (Aug. 24, 1978). Originally classified at Part 54 of Title 25 of the Code of Federal Regulations, the Department’s administrative acknowledgment procedures are today classified as Part 83. 47 Fed. Reg. 13326 (Mar. 30, 1982).
112 Webster’s International New Dictionary of the English Language (2d ed.) (1935), entry for “recognize” (v.t.).
113 Id., entries 2, 3.c, 5. See also id., entry for “acknowledge” (v.t.) 2. To own or recognize in a particular character or relationship; to admit the claims or authority of; to recognize.”
114 The phrase “recognized Indian tribe” appeared in what was then section 9 of the committee print considered by the Senate Committee on May 17, 1934. Sen. Hrgs. at 232, 242. Section 9 provided the right to organize under a constitution to “[a]ny recognized Indian tribe.” It was later amended to read “[a]ny Indian tribe, or tribes” before ultimate enactment as Section 16 of the IRA. 25 U.S.C. § 5123. The term “recognized” also appeared several times in the bill originally introduced as H.R. 7902. In three it was used in legal-political sense. H.R. 7902, 73d Cong. (as introduced Feb. 12, 1934), tit. I, § 4(j) (requiring chartered communities to be “recognized as successor to any existing political powers...”); tit. II, § 1 (training for Indians in institutions “of recognized standing”); tit. IV, § 10 (Constitutional procedural rights to be “recognized and observed” in courts of Indian offenses). H.R. 7902, tit. I, § 13(b) used the expression “recognized Indian tribe” in defining “Indian.”
suggests that the phrase “recognized vocational and trade schools” refers to those formally certified or verified as such by an appropriate official.

b. Legislative History.

The IRA’s legislative history supports interpreting “recognized Indian tribe” in Category 1 in the political-legal sense. Commissioner Collier, himself a “principal author” of the IRA, also used the term “recognized” in the political-legal sense in explaining how some American courts had “recognized” tribal customary marriage and divorce. The IRA’s legislative history further suggests that Congress did not intend “recognized Indian tribe” to be understood in a cognitive, quasi-anthropological sense. The concerns expressed by some members of the Senate Committee for the ambiguous and potentially broad scope of the phrase arguably prompted Commissioner Collier to suggest inserting “now under federal jurisdiction” in Category 1 as a limiting phrase.

As originally drafted, Category 1 referred only to “recognized” Indian tribes, leaving unclear whether it was used in a cognitive or in a political-legal sense. This ambiguity appears to have created uncertainty over Category 1’s scope and its overlap with Section 19’s other definitions of “Indian,” which appear to have led Congress to insert the limiting phrase “now under federal jurisdiction.” As noted above, we interpret “now under federal jurisdiction” as modifying “recognized Indian tribe” and as limiting Category 1’s scope. By doing so, “now under federal jurisdiction” may be construed as disambiguating “recognized Indian tribe” by clarifying its use in a political-legal sense.

c. Administrative Understandings.

Compelling support for interpreting the term “recognized” in the political-legal sense is found in the views of Department officials expressed around the time of the IRA’s enactment and early implementation. Assistant Solicitor Cohen discussed the issue in the Department’s HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (“HANDBOOK”), which he prepared around the time of the IRA’s enactment. The HANDBOOK’s relevant passages discuss ambiguities in the meaning of the term

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115 See, e.g., Sen. Hrgs. at 263 (remarks of Senator Thomas of Oklahoma) (discussing prior Administration’s policy “not to recognize Indians except those already under [Indian Office] authority”); id. at 69 (remarks of Commissioner Collier) (tribal customary marriages and divorces “recognized” by courts nationally). Representative William W. Hastings of Oklahoma criticized an early draft definition of “tribe” on the grounds it would allow chartered communities to be “recognized as a tribe” and to exercise tribal powers under section 16 and section 17 of the IRA. See id. at 308.

116 Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 390, n. 4 (citing United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 221, n. 21 (1983)).

117 Sen. Hrgs. at 69 (remarks of Commissioner Collier) (Apr. 26, 1934). On at least one occasion, however, Collier appeared to rely on the cognitive sense in referring to “recognized” tribes or bands not under federal supervision. Sen. Hrgs. at 80 (remarks of Commissioner Collier) (Apr. 26, 1934).

118 Justice Breyer concluded that Congress added “now under federal jurisdiction” to Category 1 “believing it definitively resolved a specific underlying difficulty.” Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 397-98 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Assistant Solicitor Cohen explains that the term “tribe” may be understood in both an ethnological and a political-legal sense. The former denotes a unique linguistic or cultural community. By contrast, the political-legal sense refers to ethnological groups “recognized as single tribes for administrative and political purposes” and to single ethnological groups considered as a number of independent tribes “in the political sense.” This suggests that while the term “tribe,” standing alone, could be interpreted in a cognitive sense, as used in the phrase “recognized Indian tribe” it would have been understood in a political-legal sense, which presumes the existence of an ethnological group.

Less than a year after the IRA’s enactment, Commissioner Collier further explained that “recognized tribe” meant a tribe “with which the government at one time or another has had a treaty or agreement or those for whom reservations or lands have been provided and over whom the government exercises supervision through an official representative.” Addressing the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act of 1936 (“OIWA”), Solicitor Nathan Margold opined that because tribes may “pass out of existence as such in the course of time, the word “recognized” as used in the [OIWA] should be read as requiring more than “past existence as a tribe and its historical recognition as such,” but “recognition” of a currently existing group’s activities “by specific actions of the Indian Office, the Department, or by Congress.”

The Department maintained similar understandings of the term “recognized” in the decades that followed. In a 1980 memorandum assessing the eligibility of the Stillaguamish Tribe for IRA trust-land acquisitions, Hans Walker, Jr., Associate Solicitor for Indian Affairs, distinguished the modern concept of formal “federal recognition” (or “federal acknowledgment”) from the political-legal sense of “recognized” as used in Category 1 in concluding that “formal acknowledgment in 1934” is not a prerequisite for trust-land acquisitions under the IRA, “so long as the group meets the [IRA’s] other definitional requirements.” These included that the tribe have been “recognized” in 1934. Associate Solicitor Walker construed “recognized” as referring to tribes with whom the United States had had “a continuing course of dealings or some

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119 Cohen 1942 at 268.
120 Cohen separately discussed how the term “Indian” itself could be used in an “ethnological or in a legal sense,” noting that a person’s legal status as an “Indian” depended on genealogical and social factors. Cohen 1942 at 2.
121 Id. at 268 (emphases added).
122 Ibid. at 268 (validity of congressional and administrative actions depend upon the [historical, ethnological] existence of tribes); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913) (Congress may not arbitrarily bring a community or group of people within the range of its plenary authority over Indian affairs). See also 25 C.F.R. § 83 (establishing mandatory criteria for determining whether a group is an Indian tribe eligible for special programs and services provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as Indians).
125 Memorandum from Hans Walker, Jr., Associate Solicitor, Indian Affairs, to Assistant Secretary, Indian Affairs, Request for Reconsideration of Decision Not to Take Land in Trust for the Stillaguamish Tribe at 1 (Oct. 1, 1980) (hereafter “Stillaguamish Memo”).
126 Id. at 1 (emphasis added). Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in Carcieri draws on Associate Solicitor Walker’s analysis in the Stillaguamish Memo. See Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 397-98 (Breyer, J., concurring).
legal obligation in 1934 whether or not that obligation was acknowledged at that time.” 127
Associate Solicitor Walker then noted the Senate Committee’s concerns for the potential breadth of “recognized Indian tribe.” He concluded that Congress intended to exclude some groups that might be considered Indians in a cultural or governmental sense, but not “any Indians to whom the Federal Government had already assumed obligations.” 128 Implicitly construing the phrase “now under federal jurisdiction” to modify “recognized Indian tribe,” Associate Solicitor Walker found it “clear” that Category 1 “requires that some type of obligation or extension of services to a tribe must have existed in 1934.” 129 As already noted, in the case of the Stillaguamish Tribe, such obligations were established by the 1855 Treaty of Point Elliot and remained in effect in 1934.130

Associate Solicitor Walker’s views in 1980 were consistent with the conclusions reached by the Solicitor’s Office in the mid-1970s following its assessment of how the federal government had historically understood the term “recognition.” This assessment was begun under Reid Peyton Chambers, Associate Solicitor for Indian Affairs, and offers insight into how Congress and the Department understood “recognition” at the time the Act was passed. In fact, it was this historical review of “recognition” that contributed to the development of the Department’s federal acknowledgment procedures.131

Throughout the United States’ early history, Indian treaties were negotiated by the President and ratified by the Senate pursuant to the Treaty Clause.132 In 1871, Congress enacted legislation providing that no tribe within the territory of the United States could thereafter be “acknowledged or recognized” as an “independent nation, tribe, or power” with whom the United States could contract by treaty.133 Behind the act lay the view that though Indian tribes were still “recognized as distinct political communities,” they were “wards” in a condition of dependency who were “subject to the paramount authority of the United States.”134 While the question of “recognition” remained one for the political branches,135 the contexts within which it arose expanded with the United States’ obligations as guardian.136

127 Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
128 Id. at 4 (emphasis added). This is consistent with Justice Breyer’s concurring view in Carcieri.
129 Id. at 6. In the case of the Stillaguamish Tribe, such obligations arose in 1855 through the Treaty of Point Elliot, and they remained in effect in 1934.
130 Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in Carcieri draws on the analysis in the Stillaguamish Memo. See Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 397-98 (Breyer, J., concurring).
131 25 C.F.R. § 83.
132 U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
133 Act of March 3, 1871, c. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566. Section 3 of the same Act prohibited further contracts or agreements with any tribe of Indians or individual Indian not a citizen of the United States related to their lands unless in writing and approved by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and the Secretary of the Interior. Id., § 3, 16 Stat. 570-71.
134 Mille Lac Band of Chippewas v. United States, 46 Ct. Cl. 424, 441 (1911).
After the close of the termination era in the early 1960s, during which the federal government had "endeavored to terminate its supervisory responsibilities for Indian tribes," Indian groups that the Department did not otherwise consider "recognized" began to seek services and benefits from the federal government. The most notable of these claims were aboriginal land claims under the Nonintercourse Act; treaty fishing-rights claims by descendants of treaty signatories; and requests to the BIA for benefits from groups of Indians for which no government-to-government relationship existed, which included tribes previously recognized and seeking restoration or reaffirmation of their status. At around this same time, Congress began a critical historical review of the federal government's conduct of its special legal relationship with American Indians. In January 1975, it found that federal Indian policies had "shifted and changed" across administrations "without apparent rational design," and that there had been no "general comprehensive review of conduct of Indian affairs" or its "many problems and issues" since 1928, before the IRA's enactment. Finding it imperative to do so, Congress established the American Indian Policy Review Commission to prepare an investigation and study of Indian affairs, including "an examination of the statutes and

137 South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498, 503 (1986). See also Cohen 2012 at § 1.06 (describing history and implementation of termination policy). During the termination era, roughly beginning in 1953 and ending in the mid-1960s, Congress enacted legislation ending federal recognition of more than 100 tribes and bands in eight states. Michael C. Walsh, Terminating the Indian Termination Policy, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1181, 1186 (1983). Congress has since restored federal recognition to some terminated tribes. See Cohen 2012 at § 3.02[8][c], n. 246 (listing examples).


140 AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, Final Report, Vol. I [Committee Print] at 462 (GPO 1977) (hereafter "AIPRC Final Report") ("A number of [unrecognized] Indian tribes are seeking to formalize relationships with the United States today but there is no available process for such actions."). See also TASK FORCE NO. 10 ON TERMINATED AND NONFEDERALLY RECOGNIZED INDIANS, Final Report to the American Indian Policy Review Commission (GPO 1976) (hereafter "Report of Task Force Ten").


143 Id. Commissioner John Collier raised this same issue in hearings on the draft IRA. See H. Hrgs. at 37. Noting that Congress had delegated most of its plenary authority to the Department or BIA, which Collier described as "instrumentalities of Congress...clothed with the plenary power." Being subject to the Department's authority and its rules and regulations meant that while one administration might take a course "to bestow rights upon the Indians and to allow them to organize and allow them to take over their legal affairs in some self-governing scheme," a successor administration "would be completely empowered to revoke the entire grant."

144 Id. (citing Meriam Report).

145 Id.

146 AIPRC Act, § 1(a).
procedures for granting Federal recognition and extending services to Indian communities.”\textsuperscript{147} It was against this backdrop that the Department undertook its own review of the history and meaning of “recognition.”\textsuperscript{148}

\textit{The Palmer Memorandum}

In July 1975, the acting Associate Solicitor for Indian Affairs prepared a 28-page memorandum on “Federal ‘Recognition’ of Indian Tribes” (the “Palmer Memorandum”).\textsuperscript{149} Among other things, it examined the historical meaning of “recognition” in federal law, and of the Secretary’s authority to “recognize” unrecognized groups. After surveying statutes and case law before and after the IRA’s enactment, as well as its early implementation by the Department, the memorandum notes that “the entire concept is in fact quite murky.”\textsuperscript{150} The Palmer Memorandum finds that the case law lacked a coherent distinction between “tribal existence and tribal recognition,” and that clear standards or procedures for recognition had never been established by statute.\textsuperscript{151} It further finds there to be a “consistent ambiguity” over whether formal recognition consisted of an assessment “of past governmental action” – the approach “articulated in the cases and [Departmental] memoranda” – or whether it “included authority to take such actions \textit{in the first instance}.”\textsuperscript{152} Despite these ambiguities, the Palmer Memorandum concludes that the concept of “recognition” could not be dispensed with, as it had become an accepted part of Indian law.\textsuperscript{153}

Indirectly addressing the two senses of the term “tribe” described above, the Palmer Memorandum found that before the IRA, the concept of “recognition” was often indistinguishable from the question of tribal existence,\textsuperscript{154} and was linked with the treaty-making powers of the Executive and Legislative branches, for which reason it was likened to diplomatic recognition of foreign governments.\textsuperscript{155} Though treaties remained a “prime indicia” of political

\textsuperscript{147} Id. at § 2(3).
\textsuperscript{148} See, e.g., Letter from LaFollette Butler, Acting Dep. Comm. of Indian Affairs to Sen. Henry M. Jackson, Chair, Senate (Jun. 7, 1974) (hereafter “Butler Letter”) (describing authority for recognizing tribes since 1954); Memorandum from Reid P. Chambers, Associate Solicitor, Indian Affairs to Solicitor Kent Frizzell, Secretary’s Authority to Extend Federal Recognition to Indian Tribes (Aug. 20, 1974) (hereafter “Chambers Memo”) (discussing Secretary’s authority to recognize the Stillaguamish Tribe); Memorandum from Alan K. Palmer, Acting Associate Solicitor, Indian Affairs, to Solicitor, Federal “Recognition” of Indian Tribes (Jul. 17, 1975) (hereafter “Palmer Memo”).
\textsuperscript{149} Associate Solicitor Reid P. Chambers approved the Palmer Memo in draft form. \textit{Ibid.} The Palmer Memo came on the heels of earlier consideration by the Department of the Secretary’s authority to acknowledge tribes.
\textsuperscript{150} Palmer Memo at 23.
\textsuperscript{151} Id. at 23-24.
\textsuperscript{152} Id. at 24. The memorandum concluded that the former question necessarily implied the latter.
\textsuperscript{153} Id.
\textsuperscript{154} The Palmer Memo noted that based on the political question doctrine, the courts rarely looked behind a “recognition” decision to determine questions of tribal existence per se. \textit{Id.} at 14.
\textsuperscript{155} Id. at 13. \textit{See also} Cohen 1942 at 12 (describing origin of Indian Service as “diplomatic service handling negotiations between the United States and Indian nations and tribes”).
“recognition,” the memorandum noted that other evidence could include Congressional recognition by non-treaty means and administrative actions fulfilling statutory responsibilities toward Indians as “domestic dependent nations,” including the provision of trust services. Having noted the term’s ambiguity and its political and administrative uses, the Palmer Memorandum then surveyed the case law to identify “indicia of congressional and executive recognition.” It describes these indicia as including both federal actions taken toward a tribe with whom the United States dealt on a “more or less sovereign-to-sovereign basis,” as well as actions that “clearly acknowledged a trust responsibility” toward a tribe, consistent with the evolution of federal Indian policy.

The indicia identified by the Solicitor’s Office in 1975 as evidencing “recognition” in a political-legal sense included the following: treaties, the establishment of reservations; and the treatment of a tribe as having collective rights in land, even if not denominated a “tribe.” Specific indicia of Congressional “recognition” included enactments specifically referring to a tribe.

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156 Id. at 3.
157 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831). See also AIPRC Final Report at 462 (“Administrative actions by Federal officials and occasionally by military officers have sometimes laid a foundation for federal acknowledgment of a tribe’s rights.”); Report of Task Force Ten at 1660 (during Nixon Administration “federally recognized” included tribes recognized by treaty or statute and tribes treated as recognized “through a historical pattern of administrative action.”).
158 Palmer Memo at 2; AIPRC Final Report at 111 (treaties but one method of dealing with tribes and treaty law generally applies to agreements, statutes, and Executive orders dealing with Indians, noting the trust relationship has been applied in numerous nontreaty situations). Many non-treaty tribes receive BIA services, just as some treaty-tribes receive no BIA services. AIPRC Final Report at 462; Terry Anderson & Kirke Kickingbird, An Historical Perspective on the Issue of Federal Recognition and Non-Recognition, Institute for the Development of Indian Law at 1 (1978). See also Legal Status of the Indians-Validity of Indian Marriages, 13 YALE L.J. 250, 251 (1904) (“The United States, however, continued to regard the Indians as nations and made treaties with them as such until 1871, when after an hundred years of the treaty making system of government a new departure was taken in governing them by acts of Congress.”).
159 Id. at 2-14.
160 Id. at 14.

161 Having ratified no new treaties since 1868, ARCIA 1872 at 83 (1872), Congress ended the practice of treaty-making in 1871, more than 60 years before the IRA’s enactment. See Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 566 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71). This caused the Commissioner of Indian Affairs at the time to ask what would become of the rights of tribes with which the United States had not yet treated. ARCIA 1872 at 83. As a practical matter, the end of treaty-making tipped the policy scales toward expanding the treatment of Indians as wards under federal guardianship, expanding the role of administrative officials in the management and implementation of Indian Affairs. Cohen 1942 at 17-19 (discussing contemporaneous views on the conflicts between sovereignty and wardship); Brown v. United States, 32 Ct. Cl. 432, 439 (1897) (“But since the Act 3d March, 1871 (16 Stat. L., 566, § 1), the Indian tribes have ceased to be treaty-making powers and have become simply the wards of the nation.”); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 382 (1886) (“But, after an experience of a hundred years of the treaty-making system of government, congress has determined upon a new departure,-to govern them by acts of congress. This is seen in the act of March 3, 1871...”).
162 Butler Letter at 6; Palmer Memo at 3 (executed treaties a “prime indicia” of “federal recognition” of tribe as distinct political body).
163 Butler Letter at 6 (citing Cohen 1942 at 271); Palmer Memo at 19.
tribe as an existing entity; authorizing appropriations to be expended for the benefit of a tribe; authorizing tribal funds to be held in the federal treasury; directing officials of the Government to exercise supervisory authority over a tribe; and prohibiting state taxation of a tribe. Specific indicia of Executive or administrative “recognition” before 1934 included the setting aside or acquisition of lands for Indians by Executive order; the presence of an Indian agent on a reservation; denomination of a tribe in an Executive order; the establishment of schools and other service institutions for the benefit of a tribe; the supervision of tribal contracts; the establishment by the Department of an agency office or Superintendent for a tribe; the institution of suits on behalf of a tribe; and the expenditure of funds appropriated for the use of particular Indian groups.

The Palmer Memorandum also considered the Department’s early implementation of the IRA, when the Solicitor’s Office was called upon to determine tribal eligibility for the Act. While this did not provide a “coherent body of clear legal principles,” it showed that Department officials closely associated with the IRA’s enactment believed that whether a tribe was “recognized” was “an administrative question” that the Department could determine. In making such determinations, the Department looked to indicia established by federal courts. There, indicia of Congressional recognition had primary importance, but in its absence, indicia of Executive action alone might suffice. Early on, the factors the Department considered were “principally retrospective,” reflecting a concern for “whether a particular tribe or band had been recognized, not whether it should be.” Because the Department had the authority to “recognize” a tribe for purposes of implementing the IRA, the absence of “formal” recognition in the past was “not deemed controlling” if there were sufficient indicia of governmental dealings with a tribe “on a sovereign or quasi-sovereign basis.” The manner in which the Department understood “recognition” before, in, and long-after 1934 supports the view that Congress and the


165 Palmer Memo at 19 (citing Cohen 1942 at 271)); Butler letter at 4.

166 Palmer Memo at 19 (citing Cohen 1942 at 271).

167 Id. at 6, 8 (citing United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 39-40 (1913), United States v. Boylan, 265 F. 165, 171 (2d Cir. 1920) (suit brought on behalf of Oneida Indians)).

168 Id. at 18.

169 Id.

170 Id.

171 Id. (emphasis in original). See also Stillaguamish Memo at 2 (Category I includes “all groups which existed and as to which the United States had a continuing course of dealings or some legal obligation in 1934 whether or not that obligation was acknowledged at that time.”).

172 Palmer Memo at 18.

173 See, e.g., Stillaguamish Memo. See also 25 C.F.R. § 83.12 (describing evidence to show “previous Federal acknowledgment” as including: treaty relations; denomination as a tribe in Congressional act or Executive Order; treatment by Federal government as having collective rights in lands or funds; and federally-held lands for collective ancestors).
Department understood “recognized” to refer to actions taken by federal officials with respect to a tribe for political or administrative purposes in or before 1934.


Based on the interpretation above, the phrase “any recognized Indian tribe now under federal jurisdiction” as a whole should be interpreted as intended to limit the IRA’s coverage to tribes who were brought under federal jurisdiction in or before 1934 by the actions of federal officials clearly dealing with the tribe on a more or less sovereign-to-sovereign basis or clearly acknowledging a trust responsibility, and who remained under federal authority in 1934.

Each phrase referred to a different aspect of a tribe’s trust relationship with the United States. Before and after 1934, the Department and the courts regularly used the term “recognized” to refer to exercises of federal authority over a tribe that initiated or continued a course of dealings with the tribe pursuant to Congress’ plenary authority. By contrast, the phrase “under federal jurisdiction” referred to the supervisory and administrative responsibilities of federal authorities toward a tribe thereby established. The entire phrase “any recognized Indian tribe now under federal jurisdiction” should therefore be interpreted to refer to recognized tribes for whom the United States maintained trust responsibilities in 1934.

Based on this understanding, the phrase “now under federal jurisdiction” can be seen to exclude two categories of tribe from Category 1. The first category consists of tribes never “recognized” by the United States in or before 1934. The second category consists of tribes who were “recognized” before 1934 but no longer remained under federal jurisdiction in 1934. This would include tribes who had absented themselves from the jurisdiction of the United States or had otherwise lost their jurisdictional status, for example, because of policies predicated on “the dissolution and elimination of tribal relations,” such as allotment and assimilation. Though outside Category 1’s definition of “Indian,” Congress may later enact legislation recognizing and extending the IRA’s benefits to such tribes, as Carcieri instructs. For purposes of the eligibility analysis, however, it is important to bear in mind that neither of these categories would

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174 Hackford v. Babbitt, 14 F.3d 1457, 1459 (10th Cir. 1994) ("The “ultimate purpose of the [Indian General Allotment Act was] to abrogate the Indian tribal organization, to abolish the reservation system and to place the Indians on an equal footing with other citizens of the country."); see also Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 559 (1981) (citing 11 CONG. REC. 779 (Sen. Vest), 782 (Sen. Coke), 783–784 (Sen. Saunders), 875 (Sens. Morgan and Hoar), 881 (Sen. Brown), 905 (Sen. Butler), 939 (Sen. Teller), 1003 (Sen. Morgan), 1028 (Sen. Hoar), 1064, 1065 (Sen. Plumb), 1067 (Sen. Williams) (1881); SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR ANN. REP. 1885 at 25–28; SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR ANN. REP. 1886 at 4; ARCA 1887 at IV–X; SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR ANN. REP. 1888 at XXIX–XXXII; ARCA 1889 at 3–4; ARCA 1890 at VI, XXXIX; ARCA 1891 at 3–9, 26; ARCA 1892 at 5; SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR ANN. REP. 1894 at IV). See also Cohen 1942 at 272 (“Given adequate evidence of the existence of a tribe during some period in the remote or recent past, the question may always be raised: Has the existence of this tribe been terminated in some way?”).

175 Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 392, n. 6 (listing statutes by which Congress expanded the Secretary’s authority to acquire land in trust to tribes not necessarily encompassed by Section 19).
include tribes who were “recognized” and for whom the United States maintained trust responsibilities in 1934, despite the federal government’s neglect of those responsibilities. 176

III. ANALYSIS

1. Procedure for Determining Eligibility.

As noted above, the Solicitor’s Guidance provides a four-step process to determine whether a tribe falls within Category 1 of Section 19. 177 It is not, however, necessary to proceed through each step of the procedure for every fee-to-trust application. 178 The Solicitor’s Guidance identifies forms of evidence that presumptively satisfy each of the first three steps. 179 Only in the absence of presumptive evidence should the inquiry proceed to Step Four, which requires the Department to weigh the totality of an applicant tribe’s evidence. 180 As discussed below, the Department has identified dispositive evidence under Step Two demonstrating that the Tribe was “under federal jurisdiction” in 1934. Therefore, the Tribe is eligible for the benefits of Section 5 of the IRA.


Having identified no separate statutory authority making the IRA applicable to the Tribe under Step One, our analysis proceeds to Step Two of the eligibility inquiry, which looks to whether any evidence unambiguously demonstrates that the Tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934. 181 Certain types of federal actions may constitute dispositive evidence of federal supervisory or administrative authority over Indians in 1934. 182 These are: elections conducted by the Department pursuant to Section 18 of the IRA, approval by the Secretary of a constitution following an election held pursuant to Section 16 of the IRA, issuance of a charter of incorporation following a petition submitted pursuant to Section 17 of the IRA, adjudicated treaty rights, inclusion in the Department’s 1934 Indian Population Report, and land acquisitions by the United States for groups of Indians in the years leading up to 1934. 183

Where any of these forms of evidence exist, then the Solicitor’s Office may consider the tribe to have been under federal jurisdiction in 1934 and eligible under Category 1. 184

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177 Solicitor’s Guidance at 1.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Solicitor’s Guidance at 2.
182 Id. at 2-4.
183 Id. at 2-4.
184 Id. at 2.
a. The Tribe's Section 18 Election

Section 18 of the IRA, as amended, directed the Secretary to conduct votes to allow Indians residing on a reservation to vote on whether to reject the application of the IRA. The Department compiled a list of these elections in what became known as the Haas Report. Federal courts and the Interior Board of Indian Appeals have repeatedly held that Section 18 elections are unambiguous evidence demonstrating jurisdictional status in 1934 of the tribes who participate in those elections. The calling of such elections confirmed the Secretary’s finding that those who voted were “Indians” within the meaning of the IRA. This is true irrespective of whether the Section 18 election resulted in the adoption or rejection of the IRA. Moreover, the calling of such an election by the Secretary is “certainly an acknowledgment of federal power and responsibility (i.e., federal jurisdiction)” toward the Indians for whom the election was called.

The Haas Report lists the Tribe as having held an election pursuant to Section 18 on June 10, 1935. Ultimately, the Tribe rejected the application of the IRA, with seven of the eleven total voting individuals voting “No.” Regardless of the Tribe’s vote to reject the IRA, the Section 18 election presumptively demonstrates the Tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934. Therefore, consistent with Step Two of the Solicitor’s Guidance, the Tribe is eligible to have land taken into trust.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians satisfies Category 1, and the Secretary has the statutory authority to acquire land in trust for the Tribe under Section 5 of the IRA.

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185 IRA, § 18 (“This Act shall not apply to any reservation wherein a majority of the adult Indians, voting at a special election duly called by the Secretary of the Interior, shall vote against its application”).
187 Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 394-95 (emphasis added). The Carcieri majority confirmed that the Indian Land Consolidation Act's amendments to the IRA in 1983 allowed tribes that rejected the IRA pursuant to a Section 18 election to benefit from Section 5.
189 Haas Report, Table A at 15 (listing Section 18 elections conducted).
190 Id.